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Introduction  
 
There has been a fundamental change in 
international economy, especially so in the 
last decade. Emerging and developing 
countries have significantly increased their 
weight in global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and especially in global economic  
 
growth; in particular, they have been 
responsible for most of the growth in the 
world economy since the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis (Sen, 2000; Sachs, 2005 and 
2011; Herbst and Mills, 2012; Griffith-
Jones, 2014). Indeed, among these 
emerging economies, few countries have 
been held in equal measures of 
consternation and admiration as Brazil, 
Abstract  
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Russia, India, China and South Africa, 
known collectively as BRICS. The extent to 
which they have transformed their 
economies and extended their tentacles 
across the world within a relatively short 
period of time has been subject to intense 
interest and debates (Alao, 2011; Chidozie, 
2014). These discussions are informed by 
two dominant positions; while some view 
their rapid economic development as 
possible templates for other developing 
countries to attain the economic 
advancement that has eluded them since 
independence, others believe that aspects 
of their policies caution against using the 
BRICS, or at least some of them as models 
for developing nations (Alao, 2011:5). 
 
More fundamentally, the BRICS account for 
40% of the world’s population and 20% of 
the world’s GDP (CNN.com, 2014). In 
addition, the recently concluded plans and 
the consequent announcement by the 
BRICS leaders to set up BRICS 
Development Bank (BDB) which would 
fund long-term investment in 
infrastructure and more sustainable 
development in these countries have 
heightened the suspicion of the 
international community and improved the 
global reputation of these emerging 
economic giants (CNN.com, 2014; Graffith-
Jones, 2014). If these conditions are 
juxtaposed with the growing 
discontentment, indeed resentment of the 
developing economies against the 
traditional international economic 
institutions (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank), especially given 
the latter’s penchant to undermine the 
economic institutions of the former 
through strangulating economic policies, 
the picture becomes grimmer. It is 
therefore, not surprising that the G20, at 
their recent pre-summit briefing, gave the 
IMF and World Bank an ultimatum which 
expired 31st July, 2014 to initiate reforms 
or risk mass repudiation of their policies 
(CNN.com, 2014).  
 
In view of the above, the growing concern 
over the placement of Nigeria, arguably one 
of the four largest economies in Africa, by 
far the continent’s largest market and the 
26th largest economy globally, with an 
estimated GDP of $509.9 billion, following 
the recent rebasing of her economy within 
this emerging developing economic 
construct, particularly the BRICS becomes 
pertinent (Onu, 2010; Dallaji, 2012; 
Stuenkel, 2013; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012; 
Niyi-Akinmade, 2014:29). In other words, 
the increasing debate on the heels of the 
displacement of South Africa by Nigeria as 
the largest economy in Africa, following the 
IMF and World Bank monitored rebasing in 
June, 2014 makes this study very relevant 
in contemporary international economic 
relations (CCR Report, 2012; Fioramonti, 
2013). More so, Nigeria’s radical shift in 
her foreign economic policy since 1999, 
which has given rise to the increasing 
penetration of her economy by the BRICS, 
throws up the complexities in her regional 
economic relations (Alao, 2011; Esidene et 
al, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the discourse on Nigeria’s 
economic performance over the years has 
been anchored on the country’s benchmark 
from independence, in comparison to other 
regional powers in Asia and Africa 
(Onimode, 2000). For instance, Herbst and 
Mills (2012) argued that: 
In 1965, Nigeria had a higher per capita 
GDP than Indonesia: by 1997, just before 
the financial crash, Indonesia’s per capita 
GDP had risen to more than three times 
that of Nigeria. Ghana had a higher GNP per 
capita in 1957 than South Korea. In 2011, 
according to the IMF, the average income of 
South Koreans (US$20 591) was about 16 
times that of Ghanaians (US$1 312), the 
former well above and the latter well 
below the global average of US$9 218. 
When Malaysia gained independence in 
1957, it had a per capita income less than 
that of Haiti. But at the end of the 20th 
century, when Haiti was the poorest 
country in the Americas (with a per capita 
income of US$673), Malaysia (US$8 423) 
had a standard of living higher than that of 
any major economy in that region, save for 
the US and Canada. Comparisons between 
Asia and Africa are stark even in the case of 
countries with similarities in their 
economic make-up and political histories, 
such as Indonesia and Nigeria (Herbst and 
Mills, 2012:159). 
 
To this end, contemporary scholars of 
development studies have postulated 
acronyms such as Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey (MINT); Brazil, South 
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Africa, India and China (BASIC); India, 
Brazil and South Africa (IBSA); South 
Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt (SANE); 
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey 
(MIKT); Northern rim countries – Canada, 
Russia, Scandinavia, and the northern 
United States (NORCS); Portugal, Italy 
Greece and Spain (PIGS); and Turkey, India, 
Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia (TIMBI) as 
models of regional political-economic 
integration (O’ Neil, 2001and 2012; 
Mokoena, 2007; Qi, 2011; Keating, 2012; 
Stuenkel, 2013). Among these models and 
constructs, however, BRICS model remains 
the most workable and globally 
representative in contemporary regional 
economic studies, particularly in the 
context of South-South Cooperation.  
 
In view of this background, the paper is 
partitioned into four sections, conveniently 
accommodating some sub-sections. 
Following this introduction, the second 
part of the paper probes into the 
theoretical issues in foreign economic 
relations with a view to bridging the 
analytical gaps in literature. The third part 
of the paper discusses Nigeria’s foreign 
economic relations with the BRICS 
economies. The fourth section concludes 
the paper.    
 
Theoretical Issues in Foreign Economic 
Relations 
 
Scholars of international relations and 
particularly development studies have 
often viewed inter-state relations from the 
perspective of the North-South divide. The 
North represents the advanced societies of 
Western Europe, North America and Japan 
with intimidating Gross Domestic Products 
(GDPs) and other economic indices that 
suggest development; the South, on the 
other hand, represents the countries of 
Africa, Asia (with the exception of ‘the 
newly industrialised countries’ of East 
Asia) and Latin America, with low GDPs in 
the global economic mainstream (Therien, 
1999; Chidozie, 2014:20).  
 
This latter group of countries have been 
characterised as ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries, with ‘backward economies’ and 
by implication, dependent on the former 
group of countries. To this effect, this 
general description accounts for the 
structuralists’ view of international system, 
accentuated by ‘centre/periphery’ or 
‘metropole/satellite’ description of the 
world divide between the developed and 
underdeveloped countries respectively by 
mainstream scholars who belong to the 
underdevelopment and dependency school 
of thought (Gunder, 1967 ; Amin, 1974; 
Ake, 1981). 
 
To be sure, the North-South cleavage does 
continue to be an area of reflection in 
international relations, but for most 
scholars, however, the parameters of the 
debate have changed radically. 
Explanations of this evolution vary 
enormously. For some, new attitudes have 
formed, such that ‘the traditional North-
South divide is giving way to a more 
mature partnership’ (Haq, 1995:204). 
Others maintain that the South - or the 
Third World – ‘no longer exists as a 
meaningful single entity’, or that it ‘has 
ceased to be a political force in world 
affairs’, judging by significant differences in 
their levels of development as a ‘result of 
variations in the gains of globalisation’ 
(Gilpin, 1987:304).  
 
Others suggest that ‘the North is generating 
its own internal South’ and that ‘the South 
has formed a thin layer of society that is 
fully integrated into the economic North’ 
(Cox and Sinclair, 1996:531). As 
demonstrated by these myriads of 
opinions, the image of a polarisation 
between a Northern developed hemisphere 
and a Southern developing hemisphere no 
longer offers a perfectly clear 
representation of reality. In short, the 
understanding of international political 
economy has been substantially 
transformed over recent years; and it is 
precisely the nature of these 
transformations that is the focus of this 
study. 
 
Similarly, economic foundation of foreign 
relations has often been ignored in regional 
studies, especially as it concerns 
developing economies in Africa. The 
reasons for this lacuna in contemporary 
literature are not far-fetched. The 
dominance of power politics theories has 
relegated economic factors to a peripheral 
status and a discussion of economic foreign 
policy raises several theoretical problems, 
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since conventional foreign policy literature 
does not bequeath a theoretical paradigm 
that is able to synthesize politics and 
economics, domestic and foreign policy and 
the idea of an economic foreign policy 
orientation to contemporary scholars 
(Olusanya, 1988; Bangura, 1989; Olukoshi, 
1991; Amale, 2002). Indeed, Kunle 
Amuwo’s argument seems apt as he 
posited that:  
 
The naivety of African states- and perhaps 
also the opportunism of their bankrupt 
ruling class- is the tendency to extricate the 
economy from the political (Amuwo, 
1991:85)   
Attempts made to fill these theoretical gaps 
in literature have led scholars to re-visit 
the two broad competing models of 
theoretical understanding that seek to 
explain international economic relations 
within the context of development. Thus, 
theorists vary in their approaches to the 
factors that contributed to the 
development of underdevelopment of the 
Third World countries in relation to 
developed countries. While the bourgeois 
scholars argued that the 
underdevelopment and dependency 
situation of the Third World was due to the 
internal contradictions of this group of 
countries arising from bad leadership, 
mismanagement of national resources and 
elevation of personal aggrandisement and 
primordial interests over and above 
national interest, the neo-Marxian scholars, 
on the other hand, submitted and insisted 
that, what propelled the development of 
the developed countries also facilitated, in 
the same measure, the underdevelopment 
of the underdeveloped countries. These, 
according to the latter group, are 
colonialism, slave trade and unequal 
exchange (Rosenstein, 1943; Prebisch, 
1950; Baran, 1957; Hirschman, 1958; 
Rostow, 1960; Amin, 1974; Rodney, 1974; 
Aluko and Arowolo, 2010). 
 
Specifically, the thrust of modernisation 
theories of development is that 
underdevelopment is an original state with 
the concomitant characteristics of 
backwardness or traditionalism, and that 
abandoning these characteristics and 
embracing those of the developed 
countries constitutes the route to economic 
development and cultural change 
(Martinussen, 1999). On the other hand, 
underdevelopment and dependency 
theories contend that, underdevelopment, 
far from being an original or natural 
condition of the poor societies, is a 
condition imposed by the international 
expansion of capitalism and its inalienable 
partner, imperialism (Offiong, 1981; 
Landes, 2000). That is to say, African, 
indeed, Third World underdevelopment is 
the result of economic imperialism and the 
consequent dependency.  
 
Nigeria and the BRICS Economies  
 
An attempt is made in the following section 
to delineate the dynamics of Nigeria’s 
foreign economic relations with the BRICS 
countries.  
 
Nigeria and Brazil 
 
Nigeria and Brazil signed a bilateral 
agreement in September 2005 which was 
targeted at cementing their economic and 
cultural ties. The agreement focused on 
four major areas of trade and investment, 
technical co-operation, cultural revival and 
regular political consultations. Since then, 
the value of bilateral trade has reached 
over $2 billion and the joint co-operation 
profile has covered virtually every facet of 
human activity (Alao, 2011:19). To be sure, 
between 2003 and 2005, Nigeria’s 
merchandise exports to Brazil increased 
from nearly $1.5 billion to $5 billion, 
climaxing at $8.2 billion in 2008, thus, 
placing Nigeria as the fifth-highest exporter 
of goods to Brazil, after the US, Germany, 
Argentina and China and making Brazil 
currently the second largest importer of 
Nigerian products worldwide (Alao, 
2011:9).  
 
The bulk of Nigeria’s trade with Brazil is in 
oil and gas; and Nigeria is Brazil’s largest 
source of petroleum. However, in recent 
times the two countries have identified 
other areas of mutually beneficial trade 
and co-operation. According to the report 
released by the African Development Bank 
Group (ADBG, 2011), Nigeria and Brazil 
have perceived the need to collaborate in 
the area of drugs and narcotics control; and 
most importantly, bio-fossils and its use of 
ethanol as an alternative to fuel (where 
Brazil has assumed a global leadership) as 
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issues of potential interest between the 
two countries. To this end, Brazil 
announced the plan to build a ‘Biofuel 
Town’ in Nigeria in 2007 and proposed 
initial project of US$100 million for the 
production of Ethanol from sugar cane and 
palm oil (ADBG, 2011:5).  
 
Furthermore, Nigeria and Brazil signed a 
joint agreement on energy co-operation in 
August 2009, following which an Energy 
Commission was established between the 
two countries. Consequently, Brazil 
expressed interest in completing the 
development of the Zungeru Hydropower 
Plant and financing the Mambilla 
Hydropower Project under a partnership 
that would allow the country to help 
develop Nigeria’s power industry. In return 
for Brazil’s participation in two 
hydropower projects, Nigeria will grant the 
former access to its oil and gas industry 
(Alao, 2011:20).  
 
However, the most recent effort between 
Nigeria and Brazil to foster co-operation in 
trade and investment was the 
establishment of a Bi-National Commission, 
which was set up in 2012, under the 
auspices of the Nigerian-Brazilian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (NBCCI). In this 
regard, the Chamber has provided the 
vehicle for forging bilateral ties between 
both countries by successfully organising 
two Brazilian Official Trade Missions to 
Nigeria in 2013, and a reciprocal Trade 
Mission to Brazil in the same year. These 
Trade Missions covered various areas of 
business endeavours, including 
Agricultural and Agro-Allied, Technology, 
Infrastructure, Power, Mining, Oil and Gas, 
Construction, Commerce, Aviation, 
Finance/Banking, Women Empowerment, 
Culture and Tourism (NBCCI Report, 2012).   
 
Nigeria and Russia 
 
Russo-Nigerian relations have progressed 
considerably since the latter’s 
independence culminating in the signing of 
series of Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOUs) in 2008. The first of these 
agreements was to regulate the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, while the second 
envisaged the participation of Gazprom, 
the Russian-based energy corporation, in 
the exploration and development of oil 
wells and gas reserves in Nigeria. 
Specifically, Russia’s economic interest in 
Nigeria is in the areas of infrastructure 
development, the ferrous and nonferrous 
metals industry, electric power generation, 
including nuclear energy, and the 
extraction of hydrocarbon and other raw 
minerals. For its part, Nigeria is interested 
in the electricity sector (Alao, 2011:15). 
 
In recent time however, Nigeria and Russia 
have started exploring discussions on 
space technology, nuclear energy and 
partnership in other technical fields. The 
countries have signed a nuclear agreement 
between the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority and the Russian State Atomic 
Corporation to explore and develop gas 
and hydrocarbon-related projects in 
Nigeria. In 2010 trade, between the two 
countries reached $300 million, having 
recorded a balance of trade to the tune of 
$1.5 billion mark in 2009; thus Nigeria 
became Russia’s second-largest trading 
partner in sub-Saharan Africa after South 
Africa (Anofi, 2010; Alao, 2011:15).   
 
Nigeria and India 
 
Nigeria and India signed strategic 
partnership deal called the Abuja 
Declaration, comprising four agreements: 
two MOUs on promoting interaction 
between foreign office backed institutes; 
one MOU on defence co-operation; and a 
protocol for foreign office consultations. 
Prior to this time, Nigeria and India had 
lacked institutional framework to back 
investments and commerce, thus, it was 
agreed that these pacts would set the stage 
for a more intensive relationship between 
the two countries. Thus, the areas covered 
by the Abuja Declaration were keys to 
promoting trade, investment and cultural 
exchange programme between both 
countries (Alao, 2011:18). 
 
Ugo (2010) argued that the understanding 
of Nigeria-India relations would be better 
situated within the context of the dominant 
competition between India and China, two 
leading countries in the BRICS bloc. 
According to her, India, like China, is 
positioning itself to becoming an economic 
power in the next decade. She asserted that 
India is the largest democracy in the world, 
with an estimated 1.2 billion population, 
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behind China’s 1.4 billion; world leader in 
innovation of ultra inexpensive cars 
produces the lowest cost car in the world – 
the “Nano” car from Tata Motors and 
pulling her weight also in supplying global 
human resources, as well as in computer 
software business. She submitted that, 
India is currently the 12th largest economy 
in the world based on World Bank rating 
and also ranked the 45th in the 
internationally respected Legatum 
Prosperity Index, 2009. 
 
With these economic credentials, Nigeria 
cannot ignore her relations with India in 
the 21st century international economic 
relations. According to Alao (2011), 
Nigeria’s contemporary relations with 
India are in the areas of trade and 
commerce, even though their relations cut 
across a broad spectrum. He argued that 
trade between the two countries by 2010 
was approximately $10.7 billion, of which 
$8.7 billion was to Nigeria’s advantage. He 
stressed that, by this figure, Nigeria is 
currently believed to be India’s largest 
trading partner in Africa. He concluded that 
the key areas identified include oil and gas 
(Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh 
Limited), medical and pharmaceutics, 
banking (involvement with the IBTC), 
telecommunication (Bharti Airtel invested 
$600 million to take over Zain in 2010), 
retail, movies and entertainment, and 
vehicle importation (DANA and Stallion 
Groups) (Alao, 2011:18). 
 
Nigeria and China 
 
Given the dynamic nature of China’s 
growing engagement with Africa, as well as 
the ad hoc and limited engagement that 
preceded it, an examination of Nigeria-
China relations is mostly grounded in an 
assessment of how the rising interest of 
China in Africa significantly affects Sino-
Nigeria relations. In other words, an 
appraisal of Nigeria-China relations must 
necessarily be seen in the light of the 
dynamics of China’s renewed engagement 
with Africa, especially since the end of the 
Cold War in 1989 (Srinivasan, 2008:334; 
Alli, 2010:105; Ariyo, 2010:134; Oche, 
2010:139). In view of the controversy that 
has bedevilled the relations between 
Nigeria and China, attempt has been made 
in scholarly circles to describe the nature of 
their engagement as “that of a giant to a 
bigger giant” (Owoeye and Kawonishe, 
2007:534) and “a friendship between most 
unequal equals” (Bukarambe, 2005:249).  
 
Indeed, nowhere is this lopsided 
relationship more pronounced than in the 
area of economic transactions – a 
prevailing feature of the international 
economic diplomacy of the 21st century. 
According to Bukarambe (2005), the 
economic points of contact between 
Nigeria and China are so diverse to the 
extent that the latter’s advantages are very 
manifest and the former has no reciprocity. 
He argued that, in view of the first bilateral 
trade agreement signed between the two 
countries on November 3, 1972, (other 
agreements have long been added to this), 
Chinese companies have been involved in 
projects covering roads and bridges, ports, 
oil fields, bore holes, agriculture, and 
power distribution/supply. He stressed 
that China acknowledges that up to 90 
Chinese companies are involved in Nigeria 
in various sectors covering trade, 
investments and construction (Bukarambe, 
2005:252). 
 
Bukarambe (2005) further cited Chinese 
Haier Company which is involved with PZ 
in the production of air-conditioners, 
electronics and refrigerators; China 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and 
the China National Petroleum and 
Chemicals Corporation (CNPCC), which are 
engaged in construction in association with 
Shell Petroleum (the largest foreign Oil 
Company in Nigeria) and development of 
marginal fields respectively, as veritable 
examples of Chinese trade interests in 
Nigeria. He submitted that, in all, Chinese 
construction companies got contracts 
worth up to $200 million in 2000 
(Bukarambe, 2005). These extensive trade 
relations warranted that, by 2009, Nigeria 
was among the leading two-way trade 
partners of China in Africa, alongside 
countries such as Angola, South Africa and 
Sudan; and the second-highest African 
importer from China, after South Africa 
(Alao, 2011:16). 
 
In the same vein, Owoeye and Kawonishe 
(2007), argued that one major problem in 
the relationship between Nigeria and China 
is the permanent trade deficit. According to 
them, since the formalisation of relations in 
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1971, the balance of trade has always been 
in favour of China. They stressed that, 
although trade between both states 
reached $1.86 billion in 2003 representing 
a 59% growth and further grew by 17.6% 
to $609 million with Nigeria’s export to 
China registering a growth of 330%, during 
the first four months of 2004; and in April 
2011, trade between the two countries had 
reached a new height of $ 7.76 billion, thus 
making Nigeria the fourth-largest trading 
partner and the second-largest export 
market of China in Africa, Nigeria still 
recorded a balance of trade deficit. They 
attributed this trade imbalance to the 
nature of Chinese export and import to 
Nigeria, showing that China exported 
manufactured and industrial items to 
Nigeria and imported unprocessed 
agricultural and mineral items from it. 
They concluded that, China has set up more 
than thirty solely funded companies and 
joint ventures in Nigeria, confirming that 
the former has a net industrial and 
developmental advantage over Nigeria 
(Owoeye and Kawonishe, 2007:544).  
 
By way of comparative advantage, Aja 
(2012) posits that, Nigeria is still a 
struggling economy while China is both the 
fastest growing and second largest 
economy in the world. According to him, 
the present locale of China in the world 
economic system cannot be ignored by a 
struggling economy like Nigeria, and 
logically too, in a fast changing world 
system, China cannot ignore Nigeria in both 
economic and overall strategic 
considerations in Africa. He stressed that 
Nigeria remains a potential market in the 
world at any time, and strategically, China 
needs Nigeria to consolidate its new-found 
relations in Africa. He however, regrets 
that Nigeria’s new relationship with China 
will be conditioned by the structural 
economic dependency factor against 
Nigeria, concluding that while China’s 
economy is heavily diversified with the 
capacity building to export varieties of 
produce, Nigeria is still over-dependent on 
oil as the commanding height of its 
economy (Aja, 2012). 
 
Incidentally, Alao (2011) argued that 
although China has a range of interests in 
Nigeria, its main trade interest is oil. 
According to him, several oil deals have 
been signed over the last few years, the 
most significant being the agreement that 
involved China investing $4 billion in 
Nigeria’s infrastructure in return for the 
first refusal rights on four oil blocks in 
2008. He stressed that at the centre of most 
of Nigeria’s economic diplomacy towards 
China is the principle of ‘exchanging oil for 
development’, citing a number of rail 
construction contracts signed in April 2011 
between the Nigerian Government and a 
Chinese company named China Gezhouba 
Group Corporation, such as the three 
Eastern rail lines (463 kilometre from Port 
Harcourt to Makurdi; the 1, 016 kilometre 
line from Makurdi to Kuru, with the 
inclusion of the spur lines to Jos and 
Kafanchan; and the 640 kilometre line from 
Kuru to Makurdi) as a validation of such 
diplomatic engagement. He concluded that, 
this oil for development deal inevitably put 
China on a collision course with Nigerian 
militants fighting the Nigerian state over 
the management of oil in the country’s 
Niger Delta, a course that manifested in 
hostage taking of the Chinese oil workers 
and the consequent payment of ransoms to 
free the workers (Alao, 2011). 
 
Salter (2009), on the other hand, however, 
contended that the ‘oil for infrastructure’ 
model adopted by former President 
Obasanjo in his dealings with China is dead. 
According to him, the model has been 
replaced by one in which Chinese energy 
companies gain access to the country’s oil 
resources by buying stakes in established 
companies. He argued that the termination 
of the ‘oil for infrastructure’ approach by 
the current Nigerian government 
demonstrates an incompatibility between 
this model and the Nigerian electoral cycle, 
which is designed to alternate rule by 
rotating power among different 
personalities with varying ideologies. He 
nonetheless anticipated that Chinese 
multinational companies that would have 
benefited from these infrastructure 
projects would continue to grow their 
Nigerian market share due to their 
competitive advantages in price, risk 
appetite and access to credit. He concluded 
that the Nigerian government would derive 
more benefit from its relations with China 
first by improving its negotiation capacity 
and, secondly, through a re-evaluation of 
its negotiation positions, drawing on the 
experience of China in its dealings with the 
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West, particularly concerning technology 
transfer and concessional credit (Salter, 
2009).  
 
Nigeria and South Africa 
 
In the received literature on African 
politics, scholars have expressed concern 
on the nature of the relationship between 
Nigeria and South Africa and the exact 
roles they are expected to play in the 
continent’s development. Even though, 
scholars are already contesting the 
hegemonic status of Nigeria and South 
Africa in Africa, others have reached a 
consensus on the historical roles these 
countries have been playing in the 
continent (Gwendolyn and Lyman, 2001; 
Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Alden and 
Soko, 2005; Adebajo, 2007; Landsberg, 
2008; Mikell, 2008; Chidozie, 2012; Dallaji, 
2012; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). 
In comparative terms, Nigeria and South 
Africa remain Africa’s regional economic 
and military powerhouses. Together, they 
account for 55% of the total Gross National 
Product (GNP) of the African continent and 
represent 25% of the population of the 
continent. As centres of political, economic, 
military and diplomatic gravity in West and 
Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively have risen to and fulfilled the 
popular expectation that both of them, 
working together and sharing broadly the 
same goals for Africa, are capable of 
positively influencing developments in 
Africa in the image of their political 
preferences (Akindele, 2007:317; Dallaji, 
2012:267). 
 
On the economic sphere, the difference 
between the two countries is also clear. 
Following a recent re-basing exercise of 
Nigeria’s GDP conducted by a team of local 
and international experts, including 
officials of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank (ADB) which took care 
of some sectors of her economy that have 
taken dominance since 1990, such as 
telecommunications, information 
technology, music, online sales, airlines, 
and Nollywood film production, the 
country’s GDP rating was dramatically 
altered. Consequently Nigeria’s GDP is at 
$509.9 billion above that of South Africa 
(Niyi-Akinmade, 2014:30).  Similarly, over 
the next four decades, for instance, 
Nigeria’s economy is expected to grow at 
between 5% and 7%, which is almost twice 
that of South Africa with a projected real 
GDP growth rate of 3.5% (Onu, 2010; 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, CCR, 2012:3). 
Thus, Nigeria-South Africa bilateral 
relations is shaped by the fact that South 
Africa is the continent’s strongest and most 
versatile economy, while Nigeria is Africa’s 
largest consumer market (Adebajo and 
Landsberg, 2003; Agbu, 2010; Zabadi and 
Onuoha, 2012). We therefore note that, 
while South Africa has advantage over 
Nigeria in areas of technology and 
infrastructure, Nigeria has the advantages 
of large market potentials for investment 
and large pool of human resource. 
Furthermore, Nigeria’s trade link to South 
Africa is through one commodity (oil), 
while South Africa’s trade is diverse and 
includes a range of products that Nigeria’s 
massive consumer market clearly wants. 
Indeed, by June 2002, Nigeria had become 
South Africa’s largest trading partner in 
Africa behind Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and 
Zambia. In West Africa, Nigeria is already 
South Africa’s largest trading partner, with 
bilateral trade increasing from $100 
million in 1999 to reach $5 billion in 2012 
(Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012:397). 
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Table 1: Overview of Nigeria and the BRICS 
 
 NIGERIA  BRAZIL RUSSIA INDIA CHINA SOUTH 
AFRICA 
POPULATION 160 Million  199 Million 144 Million 1.2 Billion 1.43 Billion 51 Million 
GDP PER 
PERSON 
$2 500 $10 800 $15 900 $3 500 $7 600 $6 000 
INFANT 
MORTALITY 
PER THOUSAND 
91.54 21.170 10.8 47.57 16.6 10.5 
LIFE 
EXPECTANCY 
(YEARS) 
47.56 73.43 69 65.47 73.48 52.61 
KEY IMPORTS Machinery, 
Chemicals, 
Manufacture
d goods 
Machinery Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel 
Crude Oil, 
Fertilizer 
Crude Oil, 
Mineral 
Fuel, Metal, 
Organic 
Chemicals  
Crude Oil, 
Mineral Fuel 
KEY EXPORTS Petroleum, 
Cocoa, 
Rubber 
Transport 
Equipment, 
Coffee 
Wood and 
Chemicals 
Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel, 
Chemicals 
Electrical 
and other 
Machinery, 
Textiles, 
Iron Ore 
Machinery, 
Iron and 
Steel, Motor 
Vehicles, 
Cane Sugar 
Sources: Alao, A (2011) Nigeria and the BRICs: Diplomatic, Trade, Cultural and Military 
Relations. South Africa: SAIIA, Occasional Paper No. 101; Chidozie, F.C (2014) Dependency or 
Cooperation?: Nigeria-South Africa Relations (1960-2007). Unpublished PhD Thesis, Covenant 
University, Ota: Nigeria; World Bank (Stuenkel, 2013:312) 
 
 
In view of the comparative nature of the 
work, Table 2 below presents key 
economic indicators of the BRICS 
economies to further demonstrate the high 
rate of their economic growth. More so, 
current projections by major international 
economic institutions like the IMF and the 
World Bank validate the under-listed 
economic indices, despite contrary 
speculations and caution on the part of 
some. 
 
Table 2: Key Economic Indicators of the BRICS 
 
 BRAZIL RUSSIA  INDIA CHINA  SOUTH AFRICA 
GDP 2012 ($B, 
current prices 
2,396 2,022 1,824.8 8,227 384.3 
GDP Per Capita 
2012 ($PPP) 
11,875.3 17,708.7 3,829.7 9,162 11,375.5 
Inflation 2012 5.8 6.6 11.2 2.5 5.6 
GDP Growth 
(Average 2002-
2012) 
3.5 4.7 7.2 10.3 3.5 
GDP Growth: 
Projection 2013 
2.5 2.5 5.6 7.8 2 
GDP Growth: 
Projection 2014 
3.2 3.3 6.3 7.7 2.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013:1) 
 
 
 
 
Journal of South African Business Research                                                                                                 10 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________ 
 
Sheriff Folarin, Jide Ibietan and Felix Chidozie (2016), Journal of South African Business Research,  
DOI: 10.5171/2016.808520 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations   
 
This paper has attempted to situate Nigeria 
in the current regional politico-economic 
construct, BRICS. It argued that the BRICS 
has remained the most viable and globally 
representative model for driving 
development among emerging economies. 
This has become more relevant in view of 
the fact that the current economic crises in 
Europe have defied every foreseeable 
solution, even by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Indeed, previously strong economic 
giants like Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Greece and the United States have become 
sources of concern to many international 
observers. The recent collapse of the 
French government and its subsequent 
replacement with a new administration, 
the latest in the series of economic risk that 
Europe has become, makes the situation 
bleaker. In view of this, the study makes a 
very strong case for South-South political-
economic cooperation as the only 
sustainable catalyst for global dominance. 
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